JIATF-401 Uses Intelligence Assessments to Shape Counter-UAS Requirements

The Pentagon-led Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401) is asking defense, federal, and law-enforcement organizations to identify the specific unmanned aircraft system (UAS) threats they face before they purchase or field commercial counter-drone equipment. At the Commercial Drone Alliance’s Drone Security Industry and SLTT Grant Forum, Army Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, who leads JIATF-401, described a shift toward grounding requirements in authoritative threat information rather than treating a general sense of vulnerability as sufficient justification for a particular capability. Ross urged prospective buyers and funding recipients to ask: “What is my threat? What do I actually need to be able to protect against [and where]?”

JIATF-401 has asked the Intelligence Community (IC) for assessments to inform how government organizations understand threats “both at home and abroad.” The task force’s strategic communications advisor, Lt. Col. Adam Scher, said JIATF-401 works closely with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the broader IC “to continuously assess the battlefield, analyze adversary tactics and employment, and anticipate evolving threats.” The source does not provide further details on the partnership or the specific assessments, but the stated purpose is to give agencies greater specificity as they define counter-UAS needs across a broad range of military and government components.

For industry, this approach points to requirements and evaluation criteria that may vary by mission, operating environment, and location. Providers may need to demonstrate how system performance addresses the threats identified for a particular customer, while also supporting safety-risk reviews and aviation-safety considerations. The source describes JIATF-401’s broader coordination role across counter-UAS initiatives, policies, and procurements, including work to coordinate government efforts while promoting commercial innovation. It also references the government’s online marketplace for commercial counter-drone assets and a planned approved-technologies list that could affect which systems participating organizations consider.

This is an early requirements-shaping signal, not an active bid notice. No solicitation, contract vehicle, funding amount, procurement timeline, or point of contact is identified. JIATF-401 was established in 2025 by the second Trump administration, and the task force’s activity comes amid increased reports of unlawful UAS flying or swarming near sensitive national-security sites and U.S. military installations. Ross pointed to progress over the prior 12 months, including an emerging training pipeline and engagement with state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement. Companies should monitor follow-on guidance and opportunity announcements, and prepare evidence that connects operational capability to validated threats, customer missions, location-specific conditions, and safety considerations.

• JIATF-401 is using IC threat assessments to help agencies define counter-UAS requirements before buying or fielding commercial systems.
• Brig. Gen. Matt Ross urged organizations to identify “what is my threat” and “where” protection is needed before selecting capabilities.
• JIATF-401 has requested authoritative assessments of threats “both at home and abroad.”
• ODNI and the broader IC are working with the task force to assess the battlefield, analyze adversary tactics and employment, and anticipate evolving threats.
• Suppliers should be prepared to show how their systems address mission- and location-specific threats and to support safety-risk reviews.
• A planned approved-technologies list could shape which commercial systems participating organizations consider; the source gives no publication date or selection criteria.
• JIATF-401 coordinates counter-UAS initiatives, policies, and procurements across the Department of Defense and interagency partners.
• The task force was established in 2025; Ross cited progress over the prior 12 months, including a training pipeline and engagement with state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement.
• No solicitation, funding amount, procurement contact, or active bid opportunity is identified; this signal concerns developing requirements and evaluation processes.
• The effort seeks to address unauthorized UAS activity near sensitive national-security sites and U.S. military installations while accounting for aviation safety and commercial innovation.